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Abstract
Numerous research studies have been investigated on proxy signatures over the last
decade. This survey reviews the research progress on proxy signatures, analyzes a few
notable proposals, and provides an overall remark of these proposals.
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1 Introduction
Digital signature is a cryptographic means through which the authenticity, data integrity and
senders non-repudiation can be verified. Typically, digital signature of a document is a piece
of information encrypted by the signer’s secret key. Numerous researches have shown signif-
icant contributions to this field using various cryptographic primitives [55]. However, there
are many practical environments where digital signatures do not possess specific require-
ments, and thereby digital signatures appear in several other forms viz. proxy signatures,
multi signatures, blind signatures, etc. For example, a manager of a company wants to go for
a long trip. He would need a proxy agent, to whom he would delegate his signing capability,
and thereafter the proxy agent would sign the documents on behalf of the manager.
The concept of proxy signature was recorded in 1989 [24]; however, the cryptographic
treatment on proxy signature was geared up after the scheme by Mambo et al [53] in 1996.
They first classified the proxy signature on the basis of delegation, namely full delegation,
partial delegation and delegation by warrant, and presented a well devised scheme. In full
delegation, an original signer gives his secret key to a proxy signer and the proxy signer
signs document using original signer’s secret key. The drawback of proxy signature with full
delegation is that the absence of a distinguishability between original signer and proxy signer.
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In partial delegation, the original signer derives a proxy key from his secret key and hands it
over to the proxy signer as a delegation capability. In this case, the proxy signer can misuse
the delegation capability, because partial delegation can not restrict the proxy signer’s signing
capability. The weaknesses of full and partial delegations are eliminated by partial delegation
with warrant. A warrant explicitly states the signers’ identity, delegation period and the
qualification of the message on which the proxy signer can sign, etc. Another important
requirement of a proxy signature is that the revocation of delegation capability (i.e., proxy
revocation). The proxy revocation is essential for the situation where original signer key is
compromised or any misuse of the delegation capability is noticed. It may so happen that
the original signer wants to terminate his delegation capability before its expiry. Though,
Mambo et al’s [53] scheme presented an informative idea on proxy signatures and its various
features; however, the scheme allows unlimited delegation, i.e., the proxy signer can sign any
message because the original signer delegation provides unlimited signing capability to the
proxy signer. The unlimited signing capability allows proxy signer to misuse the delegation
capability.
In 1997, Kim et al [40] proposed a scheme by restricting proxy signer signing capability
using the concept of partial delegation with warrant. Subsequently, Zhang [87], [88] proposed
threshold and non-repudiable proxy signature schemes. Ghodosi and Pieprzyk [26] analyzed
the shortcomings of [87] and the same is also noticed by Lee et al [44]. Petersen and Horster
[62] proposed another notion, called self-certified keys under different trust levels and used
them for creation of delegation capability, delegated signatures and proxy signatures. How-
ever, the work in [47] and [43] showed that Pertersen-Horster’s scheme is insecure.
In 1999, Okamoto et al [59], for the first time, proposed proxy signature based on RSA
signature scheme, but they considered the proxy unprotected notion. In the same year, Sun
proposed two schemes [72], [76] on threshold proxy signatures. Then, Lee and Kim [46]
proposed a strong proxy signature scheme. Later, Viswanathan et al [80] proposed a scheme
for controlled environments.
In 2000, Sun [73], [74] proposed a multi-proxy signature scheme and a time-stamped
proxy signature, respectively. Hwang et al [37] presented a non-repudiable threshold proxy
signature scheme with known signers. Subsequently, Yi et al [86] proposed a proxy multi-
signature scheme.
In 2001, Romao and da Silva [65] proposed secure mobile agent with proxy certificates.
Lee et al [47], [48] proposed two proxy signature schemes and highlighted a few applications.
However, Wang et al. [82] noticed that Lee et al’s scheme [48] is not secure. Park and Lee
[60] proposed another scheme for mobile communications.
In 2002, Shum and Wei [70] proposed a proxy signature scheme with proxy signer privacy
protection, but the scheme’s insecurity was noticed in [75].
Year 2003 saw a very impressive list of publications demonstrating a vigourous interest
in the proxy signature study. In this year, a number of new schemes and improvements have
been proposed [79], [36], [49], [7], [31], [32], [43], [82], [15], [13], [68], [51], [38] [39], [42],
[34], [17], [18], [50], [90], [89], [1]. However, most of the schemes observed the insecurity of
previously proposed schemes and proposed an improved one, which was subsequently broken
by others.
In 2004, a few interesting schemes [33], [19], [81], [14], [69], [83], [52], [35], [77], [78], [85],
[91], have been proposed.
In 2005, Lee and Lee [45] further addressed the security weaknesses of [70]. Later, Das
et al. [20] proposed a pairing-based proxy signature scheme with revocation.
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In this survey, we review several notable proxy signature schemes categorizing them into
different constructions based on their security assumptions. The organization of the survey
is as follows. In the next section, we give a mathematical background for general readership.
Section 3 discusses the security properties of proxy signature. Section 4 details the construc-
tions of various proxy signatures. Section 5 reviews some of the notable schemes. Finally,
Section 6 gives an overall remarks on our observations.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm is the inverse of discrete exponentiation in a finite cyclic group. Sup-
pose G be a finite multiplicative cyclic group of order a large prime q. Let g be a generator
of G. Then every element y of G can be written in the form y = gk for some integer k. The
discrete logarithm of y is k and is written as loggy = k mod q.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [21] revolutionized the cryptography and proposed a key ex-
change protocol without using secure channel, where the security of the protocol relies on
discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Since then, several key exchange [11], public key encryp-
tion [12], [55], and signature schemes [22], [27], [71] have been proposed in which the security
assumptions trust on the hardness of the DLP.
The Schnorr signature scheme: The scheme Ssch is based on DLP and works as follows:
Setup (SPdlp): Inputs 1
k; and outputs params-dlp. The params-dlp consists of primes q
and l such that 2k−1 ≤ q < 2k, an element g ∈ Z∗q of order l that divides q − 1, and a hash
function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zl.
KeyGen (KGdlp): The users agree on a group G (multiplicative group of integers modulo q for
some prime q with generator g of prime order l in which the DLP is hard. The user chooses
a secret key x ∈ Zl. The public key is generated as y = g
x mod q.
In other words, user public key ←KGdlp(params-dlp, user secret key),
i.e. y ←KGdlp(params-dlp, x)
Sign (Sdlp): To sign a message m, choose a random t ∈ Zl and compute r = g
t mod q.
Compute c = h(m, r) and σ = (t− xc) mod l. The signature of m is (σ, c).
In other words, σ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (t, r), x, m).
Verify (Vdlp): Compute r
′ = gσyc (mod q) and c′ = h(m, r′). If c′ = c then the sig-
nature is valid. In other words, Result← Vdlp(params-dlp, y, σ, m), where Result ∈
{V alid, Invalid}.
The Schnorr’s signature scheme is proven secure [71] under the assumption that DLP is hard.
2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Bilinear pairings were first introduced to elliptic curve cryptography for destructive methods
like the MOV reduction [54]. With the help of Weil pairing, the authors of [54] showed a
way to reduce the DLP on supersingular elliptic curves to the DLP of an extension of the
underlying finite field. Later, Frey and Ruck [23] extended the attack to general elliptic
curves with the Tate pairing. However, the Weil pairing and the Tate pairing can also be
used as a constructive tool for cryptography [9], [10], [16], [30].
Suppose G1 is an additive cyclic group generated by P of prime order q, and G2 is a
multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. A map eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 is called a bilinear
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mapping if it satisfies the following properties:
- Bilinear: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q;
- Non-degenerate: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1;
- Computable: There exist efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
In general, G1 is a group of points on an elliptic curve and G2 is a multiplicative subgroup
of a finite field.
Computational Problems
Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) : Given Q,R ∈ G1, find an integer x ∈ Z
∗
q
such that R = xQ.
Definition 2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP, cP ) for a, b, c ∈
Z
∗
q, determine whether c ≡ ab mod q.
The advantage of any PPT algorithm A in solving DDHP in G1 is defined as Adv
DDH
A,G1
= [Prob[A(P, aP, bP, cP ) = 1]–Prob[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1]: a, b ∈ Z∗q]. For every PPT
algorithm A, AdvDDH
A,G1
is negligible.
Definition 3. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP ) for a, b ∈
Z
∗
q, compute abP .
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A in solving CDHP
in G1, is defined as Adv
CDH
A,G1
= Prob[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1 : a, b ∈ Z∗q]. For every PPT
algorithm A, AdvCDH
A,G1
is negligible.
Definition 4. Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group: A prime order group G1 is a GDH group if
there exists an efficient polynomial-time algorithm which solves the DDHP in G1 and there
is no PPT algorithm which solves the CDHP with non-negligible probability of success. The
domains of bilinear pairings provide examples of GDH groups. The MOV reduction [54]
provides a method to solve DDHP in G1, whereas there is no known efficient algorithm for
CDHP in G1.
Definition 5. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP, cP ) for a, b, c ∈ Z∗q,
compute eˆ(P,P )abc.
Definition 6. Weak Diffie-Hellman Problem (WDHP) : Given (P,Q, aP ) for a ∈ Z∗q, compute
aQ.
Since most of our discussions on pairing-based proxy signatures are surrounded by Hess’s
signature scheme [30], we discuss the scheme as follows.
The Hess signature scheme: The scheme Shess is based on CDHP and works as follows:
Setup(SPcdhp): It takes 1
k and master-key s as input; and outputs params-cdhp. The
params-cdhp includes groups G1, G2 of order prime q; a generator P ∈ G1; a bilinear map
eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2; map-to-point H : {0, 1}
∗ → G1, hash function h : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
and public key of a trusted party, say Key Generation Center (KGC) (PubKGC = sP ). The
KGC keeps s secret.
KeyGen (KGcdhp): It takes params-cdhp, user (with identity ID) public key PubID = H(ID)
as input; outputs user secret key SID = sPubID,
i.e., SID ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, PubID).
Sign (Scdhp): To sign a message m, the signer chooses an arbitrary P1 ∈ G1, picks a random
t ∈ Z∗q and computes
r = eˆ(P1, P )
t.
c = h(m, r).
σ = cSID + tP1.
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The signature of m is the tuple (c, σ).
In other words, σ ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (t, r, c), SID, m)
Verify (Vcdhp): The signature (c, σ) is verified by the following checking:
Compute r′ = eˆ(σ, P ) · eˆ(H(ID),−PubKGC)
c. Accept the signature if c = h(m, r′).
In other words,Result←Vcdhp(params-cdhp, PubID, PubKGC , σ, (c,m)), whereResult ∈
{V alid, Invalid}.
The Hess’s signature scheme is proven secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-
message attack under the assumption that CDHP is hard.
2.3 Integer Factorization Problem
The integer factorization (also known as prime decomposition) problem (IFP) is: Input a
large positive integer; output it as a product of prime numbers. The problem holds a strong
security assumption in cryptography, complexity theory, and quantum computers. Based on
IFP, the most widely use scheme for public key encryption and signature is RSA [64]. There
are many algorithms, protocols, and products where security relies on IFP.
The RSA signature scheme: The signature scheme Srsa works as follows:
Setup(SPrsa): Inputs 1
k, secret large primes p, q; and outputs params-rsa. The params-
rsa consists of a public modulus N = pq and hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → ZN .
KeyGen (KGrsa): Choose public key e such that 1 < e < φ(N) which is co-prime to φ(N),
where φ(N) = (p−1)(q−1). Compute secret key d such that de ≡ 1 mod φ(N). Procedurally,
d←KGrsa(params-rsa, e).
Sign (Srsa) : To sign a message m, compute σ = h(m)
d mod N . The signature of a message
m is the tuple (m,σ).
In other words, σ ← Srsa(params-rsa, d, m).
Verify (Vrsa) : Compute m
′ = σe mod N . The signature is valid if m′ = h(m).
In other words, Result← Vrsa(params-rsa, e, σ, m), Result ∈ {V alid, Invalid}.
3 Security Properties of a Proxy Signature
Desirable security properties of proxy signatures have evolved from the introduction of proxy
signature. A widely accepted list of required properties is given below:
- Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature
on behalf of the original signer. But the original signer and other third parties cannot
create a valid proxy signature.
- Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of corresponding proxy signer
from the proxy signature.
- Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature on behalf of
the original signer, he cannot deny the signature creation.
- Verifiability: The verifier can be convinced of the signers’ agreement from the proxy
signature.
- Distinguishability: Proxy signatures are distinguishable from the normal signatures by
everyone.
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- Secrecy: The original signer secret key cannot be derived from any information, such
as the shares of the proxy key, proxy signatures, etc.
- Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for other purposes
than it is made for. That is, he cannot sign message with the proxy key that have
not been defined in the warrant. If he does so, he will be identified explicitly from the
warrant.
3.1 Classification of Proxy Signature
According to the nature of delegation capability, proxy signature can be classified as proxy-
unprotected, proxy-protected and threshold notions. This differentiation is important in
practical applications, since it enables proxy signature schemes to avoid potential disputes
between the original signer and proxy signer.
3.1.1 Proxy-unprotected notion
The scenario exists when an original signer gives his signing rights (full delegation with
warrant) to a proxy signer. The original signer sends a signed warrant to the proxy signer,
who then uses this information to generate proxy signatures by executing a standard signature
scheme. When a proxy signature is sent, the recipient checks its validity according to the
corresponding standard signature verification process. As the proxy signer does not append
his secret key on top of the received delegation, a dishonest original signer can sign the
message and later claim that the signature was created by the proxy signer. This type of
proxy signature primarily lacks strong unforgeability property.
3.1.2 Proxy-protected notion
This is the scenario when the proxy signer uses his secret key to safeguard him from the
original signer’s forgery. In this case, the original signer sends a signed warrant to the proxy
signer, who then uses it to construct a proxy key by appending his secret key. With the
proxy key, the proxy signer can generate proxy signatures by executing a standard signature
scheme. When a proxy signature is sent, the recipient first computes the proxy public key
from some public information, and then checks its validity according to the corresponding
standard signature verification process. By this technique, neither the original signer frames
proxy signer nor the proxy signer frames original signer.
3.1.3 Threshold notion
In a threshold proxy signature, the proxy key is shared by a group of n proxy signers. In order
to produce a valid proxy signature on a given message m, individual proxy signer produce
his partial signature on that message, and then combines them into a full proxy signature on
message m.
In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates his signing capability
to a proxy group of n members. Any t or more proxy signers of the group can cooperatively
issue a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, but (t−1) or less proxy signers cannot
forge a signature.
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4 Models of Proxy Signature
Based on the security assumptions on various proxy signature schemes, we categorize the
existing schemes into four different constructions: DLP-based proxy signature, RSA-based
proxy signature, ECDSA-based proxy signature, and Pairing-based proxy signature. The
schemes consist of delegation capability generation, delegation capability verification, proxy
key generation, proxy signature generation and proxy signature verification.
4.1 DLP-based Proxy Signature
The participants involved in the model are:
- an original signer, who delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer.
- a proxy signer, who signs the message on behalf of the original signer.
- a verifier, who verifies the proxy signature and decides to accept or reject.
- a trusted party who certifies the public key.
DLP-based Proxy Signature Model: An original signer selects a secret key xo and
computes his public key yo as
yo ← KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
A proxy signer selects a secret key xp and computes his public key yp as
yp ← KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: It takes params-dlp, original signer chosen parameters
(ko, ro), original signer secret key xo, a warrant ω as input; and outputs signature σo on ω,
Procedurally, σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, ω)
Delegation capability verification: It takes params-dlp, yo, ω, σo as input; and outputs
Result, where Result∈ {V alid, Invalid},
i.e., Result← Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo, ω).
Proxy key generation(PKeyGendlp): It takes params-dlp, σo, xp and random number as
input; and outputs proxy key ρp. Typically, the proxy signer uses simple arithmetic operation
to form a proxy key ρp = yoσo + xpyp mod q.
Procedurally, ρp ← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, pub-params
1)
Proxy signature generation: It takes params-dlp, proxy key ρp and message m as input;
outputs signature σp on m, i.e, σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, ρp, m)
Proxy signature verification: It takes params-dlp, yo, yp, m and σp as input; outputs
Result, i.e., Result← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, m).
4.2 RSA-based proxy signature
The participants involved in the model are:
- an original signer, who delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer.
- a proxy signer, who signs the message on behalf of the original signer.
- a verifier, who verifies the proxy signature and decides to accept or reject.
- a trusted party who certifies the public key.
RSA-based Proxy Signature Model: An original signer selects a public key yo and
computes his secret key xo as
1pub-params include signers’ public keys, random numbers, warrant, etc.
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xo ← KGrsa(params-rsa, yo).
A proxy signer selects a public key yp and computes his secret key xp as
xp ← KGrsa(params-rsa, yp).
Delegation capability generation: It takes params-rsa, xo, a warrant ω as input; and outputs
signature σo on ω, Procedurally, σo ← Srsa(params-rsa, xo, ω)
Delegation capability verification: It takes params-rsa, yo, ω, σo as input; and outputs
Result. That is, Result← Vrsa(params-rsa, yo, σo, ω), where Result ∈ {V alid, Invalid}.
Proxy signature generation: It takes params-rsa, σo, xp and message m as input; outputs
signature σp on m, i.e, σp ← Srsa(params-rsa, xp, (σo,m))
Proxy signature verification: It takes params-rsa, yo, yp, m and σp as input; and outputs
Result, i.e., Result← Vrsa(params-rsa, (yo, yp), σp,m).
4.3 Pairing-based proxy signature
The participants involved in the model are:
- an original signer, who delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer.
- a proxy signer, who signs the message on behalf of the original signer.
- a verifier, who verifies the proxy signature and decides to accept or reject.
- a trusted party who issues user secret key.
Pairing-based Proxy Signature Model: The original signer generates his public key yo =
H(IDo), and computes secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo), where IDo is original
signer’s identity.
The proxy signer generates his public key yp = H(IDp), and computes secret key
xp ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yp), where IDp is proxy signer’s identity.
Delegation capability generation: It takes params-cdhp, xo and a warrant ω as input;
outputs signature σo on ω, i.e., σo ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (ko, ro, co), xo, ω).
Delegation capability verification: It takes params-cdhp, yo, ω and σo as input; and outputs
Result, i.e., Result← Vcdhp(params-cdhp, (yo, PubKGC), σo, (co, ω)), where Result ∈
{V alid, Invalid}.
Proxy key generation: It takes params-cdhp, σo, xp and random number as input; and
outputs proxy key ρp← PKeyGencdhp(params-cdhp, σo, (user-params
2), xp).
Proxy signature generation: It takes params-cdhp, proxy key ρp and message m as input;
outputs signature σp on m, i.e., σp ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (kp, rp), ρp, m).
Proxy signature verification: It takes params-cdhp, yo, yp, m and σp as input; outputs
Result, i.e., Result← Vcdhp(params-cdhp, (yo, yp, PubKGC), σp, (cp,m, ω)).
2The user-params includes signers’ public keys, random numbers, warrant, etc.
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5 Review of Some Notable Proxy Signatures
5.1 DLP-based proxy signature schemes
Conventions and notation for DLP-based proxy signature schemes
Alice Original signer
Bob Proxy signer
q A large prime
Zq Set of integers modulo q
Z
∗
q Multiplicative group of Zq
g Generator of large order in Z∗q
xo, xp Secret key of Alice and Bob, respectively
yo Public key of Alice, yo = g
xo mod q
yp Public key of Bob, yp = g
xp mod q
ω A warrant
h(.) A collision-resistant one-way hash function
5.1.1 Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto [53]
First classified the proxy signature on the basis of the degree of delegation, and proposed a
well devised scheme. In the scheme both proxy unprotected and proxy protected notions are
envisaged. As we are more focused on proxy-protected scheme, here we discuss the proxy-
protected notion.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice selects a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Bob selects a secret key xp and generates public key yp ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice chooses a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes
ro = g
ko mod q. Alice computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp ← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, pub-
params).
Proxy signature generation: The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (kp, rp), ρp, m).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, m).
Security: The underlying security of the scheme is based on the hardness of DLP. However,
the scheme has two weaknesses. Firstly, unlimited delegation, i.e., Bob can sign any message
on behalf of Alice because Alice has delegated unlimited signing rights to Bob. Secondly,
proxy transfer, i.e., If Bob transfers Alice’s delegation power to any other party who can sign
any message on behalf of Alice. In other words, the scheme does not satisfy the prevention
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5.1.2 Kim, Park and Won [40]
Proposed proxy signature for partial delegation with warrant and proxy signature for thresh-
old delegation.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Scheme for partial delegation with warrant (PDW):
Alice chooses a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Bob chooses a secret key xp and generates public key yp ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice chooses a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes
ro = g
ko mod q. Then, Alice computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, ω).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo, ω).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp ← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, pub-
params).
Proxy signature generation: The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (kp, rp), ρp, m).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, (ω,m)).
Scheme for Threshold Delegation: In the threshold delegation, Alice sends her delegation to
a proxy group so that to sign a message the proxy signer’s power is shared.
Alice chooses a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Each proxy signer acts as a dealer with a random secret u, chooses a random polynomial
such that f(x) = u + a1x+ · · · + at−1x
t−1 mod q − 1. The proxy group keys are generated
as follows:
Public keys: gu mod q, ga1 mod q, · · · , gat−1 mod q.
Secret keys: xp,i = u+ a1i+ · · ·+ at−1i
t−1; i = 1, 2, · · · , t.
Delegation capability generation: Alice chooses a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes
ro = g
ko mod q. Then Alice computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, ω).
Proxy Sharing: To share σo in a threshold manner with threshold t, Alice chooses random
bj ∈ Zq−1; j = 1, 2, · · · , t − 1, and publishes the values Bj = g
bj , j = 1, 2, · · · , t − 1. Then,
she computes the proxy share σi as σi = f
′(i) = σo + b1i+ · · ·+ bt−1i
t−1.
Delegation capability verification: Each proxy signer accepts σi if and only if
gσi = y
h(ω,ro)
o ro ·
∏t−1
j=1B
(ij)
j mod q.
Proxy key generation: Each proxy signer computes proxy key as
ρp,i ← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σi, xp,i, pub-params).
Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m, each proxy signer computes v = h(l,m),
where l = gr mod q (r is secret to the proxy signer). Then, the proxy signer computes
λi = si + σiv mod q − 1 and reveals λi, where si = f(i) = r + a1i + · · · + at−1i
i−1. On
validating λi, each proxy signer computes σ satisfying σ = r+σov = f(0)+ f
′(0)v mod q− 1
by applying Lagrange formula to λi. The proxy signature on m is the tuple (ω, ro,m, σ, v).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier checks whether v′ = gσ · (yo · yp)
h(ω,ro)ro)
−v mod q,
and then whether v = h(v′,m).
Security: To the best of our knowledge the proposed PDW scheme is still unbroken. How-
ever, the intuition in this scheme that using warrant does not require proxy revocation is
not correct. There are many situations where proxy revocation is a must though warrant
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explicitly states the validity and restricts the message signing. Sun et al [76] showed that the
above threshold delegation approach is not secure.
5.1.3 Zhang [87]
Proposed threshold and non-repudiable proxy signatures, where both the original signer and
proxy signer can not falsely deny their signature.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice chooses a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Assume that there is a group of n proxy signers pi, i = 1, · · · , n.
Proxy key generation: Alice picks ko ∈ Zq−1, computes R = g
ko mod q, and broadcasts R.
The proxy signer randomly selects αi ∈ Zq−1, computes ypi = g
αiR mod q, checks whether
ypi ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and if it holds then broadcasts ypi.
Alice computes Rˆ =
∏n
i=1 ypi , and sˆ = n
−1Rˆxo + k mod q − 1 and broadcasts sˆ. Then, each
proxy signer computes Rˆ =
∏n
i=1 ypi , σpi = sˆ+αi mod q−1, and checks if the equality holds:
gsˆ = yn
−1RˆR mod q. If it holds, the proxy signer accepts σpi as a valid proxy share.
The threshold proxy signature and verification are done in similar approaches as in the
schemes [29], [25].
Security: Lee et al.’s [44] and [76] pointed out some weaknesses in Zhang’s threshold proxy
signatures [87]. Later, some additional attacks are commented in [26].
5.1.4 Petersen and Horster [62]
Proposed a scheme for self-certified keys issuance under different trust level and used them
for delegation of signing rights and delegated signatures, proxy signatures.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice picks a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Bob picks a secret key xp and generates public key yp ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice picks a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes ro = g
ko
mod q. Then, Alice computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, ProxyID).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo, ProxyID).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, public-
parameters).
Proxy signature generation: The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, ρp, (m,ProxyID)).
Proxy signature verification : The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, (m,ProxyID)).
Security: The scheme has three weaknesses. Firstly, the proxy signer can deny his signature
creation later because a proxy signature does not contain any authentic information of proxy
signer. Secondly, the proxy signer gets a proxy key pair (xp, yp) from the original signer. He
can deny his signature by showing that the proxy signature is created by the original signer
with the name of him. Thirdly, the original signer sends the signing rights to a proxy signer
without any agreement or warrant. The original signer can argue that the proxy signature is
not valid for the concerned message. Moreover, the schemes in [47], [43] further pointed out
some more weaknesses of this scheme.
DAS et al. Proxy Signatures 12
5.1.5 Sun, Lee and Hwang [76]
Proposed a (t, n) threshold proxy signature based on Zhang’s threshold scheme [87].
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice picks a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Assume that there is a group of n proxy signers pi, i = 1, · · · , n. Each proxy signer pi has a
secret key xpi ∈ Zq−1 and a public key ypi ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xpi).
Proxy generation: Alice picks ko ∈ Zq−1, computes R = g
ko mod q, and broadcasts R. Then
each proxy signer randomly selects αi ∈ Zq−1, computes rpi = g
αiR mod q.
Alice computes Rˆ =
∏n
i=1 rpi mod q, and sˆ = n
−1xoh(Rˆ, PGID) + ko mod q − 1 and broad-
casts sˆ, where PGID is the proxy group identity that records the proxy status, the event
mark of the proxy share generation, the expiration time of the delegation, the identities of
original signer and proxy signers. After validating sˆ, each proxy signer performs a (t, n) veri-
fiable threshold secret sharing scheme [61], and acts as a dealer to distribute proxy sub-shares
to other n − 1 proxy signers for generating their valid proxy shares. Each proxy signer pi
selects a (t − 1)-degree polynomial fi(x) = si + ai,1x + ai,2x
2 + · · · + ai,t−1x
t−1 mod q − 1,
where si = sˆ + αi + xpih(Rˆ, PGID) mod q − 1. Then pi sends the proxy sub-share fi(j) to
proxy signer pj(for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= i) vis a secure channel. In addition, pi also broadcasts
gai,1 , · · · , gai,t−1 .
After validating all fj(i), pi computes x
′
i =
n∑
j=1
fj(i) mod q − 1 as his proxy share. Let
f(x) =
n∑
j=1
fj(x) mod q − 1. This proxy share can be written as x
′
i = f(i) and will
be used for generating proxy signatures. The shared secret key is regarded as f(0) =
nˆs+
n∑
i=1
αi +
n∑
i=1
xpih(Rˆ, PGID) =
n∑
i=1
(αi + ko) +
n∑
i=0
xpih(Rˆ, PGID) mod q − 1.
Proxy signature generation: Each participant proxy signer pi (1 ≤ i ≤ t) performs a
(t, t) verifiable secret sharing scheme by randomly choosing a (t − 1)-degree polynomial
f ′i(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
a′i,jx
j mod q − 1 and broadcasts c′i,j = g
a′i,j mod q for j = 0, 1 · · · , t − 1. Then
pi computes f
′
i(j) and sends it to pj via a secure channel for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= i. After
validating each f ′i(j), each participant proxy signer pi computes x
′′
i = f(i) =
t∑
j=1
f ′j(i) mod
q − 1, where f ′(x) =
t∑
j=1
f ′j(x) mod q − 1 and Y =
t∏
k=1
c′k,0 mod q. Finally, each pi computes
and broadcasts Ti = x
′
ih(m) + x
′′
i Y mod q − 1.
On validating Ti, each pi computes T = f(0)h(m) + f
′(0)Y mod q − 1 from Tj by applying
Lagrange’s interpolating polynomial, where m is the message. The proxy signature on mes-
sage m is the tuple (Rˆ, PGID, Y, T ).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
gT =

(yo n∏
i=1
yi
)h(Rˆ,PGID)
Rˆ


h(m)
Y Ymod q.
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Security: Hsu et al. [34] and Shao [69] noticed that Sun et al.’s scheme is not secure, it lacks
coalition attack.
5.1.6 Lee, Kim and Kim [48]
Proposed a scheme in which a mobile agent is constructed using non-designated proxy sig-
nature which represents both the original signer’s (customer) and the proxy signer’s (remote
server) signatures. The work provides Schnorr-based and RSA-based constructions for secure
mobile agent. Here, we give the Schnorr-based construction, the RSA-based construction is
given in the next section.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice chooses a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Bob chooses a secret key xp and generates public key yp ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice chooses a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes
ro = g
ko mod q. Then she computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, ω).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo, ω).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, public-
parameters).
Proxy signature generation: The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (kp, rp), ρp, m).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid ← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, (m,ω)).
Security: Wang et al. [82] showed that the scheme is insecure against transferring, forgery
attacks.
5.1.7 Boldyreva, Palacio and Warinschi [7]
First proposed a formal security notion for proxy signature. At the same time, they proposed
a provable secure scheme, called triple Schnorr proxy signature scheme, which is an enhanced
version of the scheme [40].
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Alice chooses a secret key xo and generates public key yo ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xo).
Bob chooses a secret key xp and generates public key yp ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice chooses a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes
ro = g
ko mod q. Then computes σo ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (ko, ro), xo, (ω, yo, yp)).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yo, σo, (ω, yo, yp)).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp ← PKeyGendlp(params-dlp, σo, xp, pub-
params).
Proxy signature generation: The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (kp, rp, yo, yp), ρp, m)).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid ← Vdlp(params-dlp, (yo, yp), σp, m)).
Security: The scheme is based on Kim et al’s PDW scheme [40]. However, they did not
DAS et al. Proxy Signatures 14
consider warrant in the proxy signing phase which leads unlimited delegation, that is, the
scheme suffers from delegation misuse.
5.1.8 Li, Tzeng and Hwang [49]
Proposed a generalized version (t1/n1− t2/n2) proxy signature scheme . The (t1/n1− t2/n2)
proxy signature scheme allows t1 out of n1 original signers to delegate their signing capability
to a designated proxy group of t2 out of n2 proxy signers. The proxy group of proxy signers
can cooperatively generate the proxy signature on behalf of the original group. Any verifier
can verify the proxy signature on the message with the knowledge of the identities of the
actual original signers and the actual proxy signers.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
Let the scheme consists of n1 original signers and n2 proxy signers.
For i = 1, 2, · · · , n1, the original signer chooses a secret key xoi and generates public key yoi
←KGdlp(params-dlp, xoi).
For j = 1, 2, · · · , n2, the proxy signer chooses a secret key xpj and generates public key ypj
←KGdlp(params-dlp, xpj).
Delegation capability generation: For i = 1, 2, · · · , t1 (< n1), the original signer chooses
a random number koi ∈ Z
∗
q−1 and computes roi = g
koi mod q. Then the original signer
computes σoi ← Sdlp(params-dlp, (koi , roi), xoi , ω). A designated clerk (any one of the
original signers) verifies the individual proxy shares as whether
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, yoi , σoi , ω).
If it holds, the clerk combines the individual proxy shares as σo =
t1∑
i=1
σoi mod q − 1. The
final proxy share is the tuple (ω,K, σo), where K =
t1∏
i=1
roi .
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vdlp(params-dlp, (K, yo), σo, ω).
Proxy signature generation: Each proxy signer selects a random integer kpj ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes
rpj = g
kpj mod q, and broadcast rpj . Then, each proxy signer computes R =
∏t2
j=1 rpj mod
q and σpj = kpjR+ (σot
−1
2 + xoiyoi)
h(m,R,ProxyID) mod q− 1, where t2 is the threshold value
of the proxy signers group.
A designated clerk verifies the individual proxy signature as whether
gσpj = rRpj((K
K
∏t1
i=1 y
yoih(ω,K)
oi )
t−12 y
ypj
pj )
h(m,R,ProxyID) mod q. If it does, the clerk combines
the individual proxy signature of m as σ =
∑t2
j=1 σpj mod q − 1. The proxy signature of m
is (ω,K,m,R, σ).
Proxy signature verification: A verifier checks the validity of the proxy signature on m
whether gσ = RR(KK
∏t1
i=1 y
yoih(ω,K)
oi
∏t2
j=1 y
ypj
pj )
h(m,R,ProxyID) mod q.
Security: The security analysis of the scheme is not rigorous.
5.1.9 Herranz and Saez [33]
Proposed a distributed proxy signature scheme. The scheme extended the work in [7] to the
scenario of fully distributed proxy signature schemes.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
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Generation of keys: Let E = {P (1), P ((2), · · · , P (n)} be a distributed entity formed by n
participants. There is an access structure Γ ⊂ 2E , which is formed by those subsets of
participants which are authorized to perform the secret task. The access structure must be
monotone increasing; that is, if A1 ∈ Γ is authorized and A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ E, then A2 must be
authorized. The joint generation of discrete logarithm keys is as follows:
Each participant P (l) ∈ E obtains a secret value x(l) ∈ Zq−1. The values {x
(l)}P (l)∈E form a
sharing of the secret key x ∈ Zq−1, according to some linear secret sharing scheme realizing
the access structure Γ. The corresponding public key y = gx mod q is made public, along
with other values (commitments) which ensure the robustness of the protocol.
The fully distributed triple Schnorr proxy signature scheme is generated in a similar way of
the Boldyreva et al’s scheme [7].
Security: The scheme is as secure as Kim et al’s PDW scheme [40].
5.1.10 Malkin, Obana and Yung [52]
Presented a formal model for fully hierarchical proxy signatures with warrant that supports
chains of several levels of delegation.
Assumption: DLP is hard.
The signers’ selects secret key xi and computes public key yi ←KGdlp(params-dlp, xi).
Delegation capability generation: This is an interactive process between the designator and
proxy signer. It takes public keys of a designator yiL−1 and a proxy signer yiL , the signing
key of which the designator delegates its signing right (i.e., the signing key is either a signing
key xiL−1 or a proxy key σio···→iL−1 depending on whether iL−1 is original signer or proxy
signer), a warrant up to previous delegation WL−1 and a warrant ωL set in current delegation
as inputs; outputs delegation rights.
Proxy key generation: It takes public keys of a designator yiL−1 and a proxy signer yil , the
secret key of the proxy signer xiL as inputs and outputs a proxy key σio···→iL and a warrant
ω.
Proxy signature generation : The proxy signature on message m is computed as
σp ← Sdlp(params-dlp, σio···→iL , (m,ω)).
Proxy signature verification : The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid ← Vdlp(params-dlp, yio, σp, (m,ω)).
Security: The scheme formalizes a model of fully hierarchical proxy signature, which is a
probably secure model to the best of our knowledge.
5.2 RSA-based Proxy Signature
5.2.1 Okamoto, Tada and Okamoto [59]
Proposed a scheme that reduces the computation and storage cost during the protocol exe-
cution, and the protocol is suitable for implementation in smart card.
Assumption: IFP is hard and smart card is tamper resistant.
Alice chooses a public key yo and generates secret key xo ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yo).
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes σo ← Srsa(params-rsa, xo, (ω, Ip)) where
Ip denote the limit of money which she can spend.
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, yo, σo, (ω, Ip)).
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Conventions and notation for RSA-based proxy signature schemes
Alice Original signer
Bob Proxy signer
No, Np RSA Modulus for Alice and Bob, respectively
yo Public key of Alice, where 1 < yo < φ(No)
yp Public key of Bob, where 1 < yp < φ(Np)
xo Secret key of Alice, where xoyo ≡ 1 mod φ(No)
xp Secret key of Bob, where xpyp ≡ 1 mod φ(Np)
ω A warrant
h(.) A collision-resistant one-way hash function
Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m, Bob generates a random number kp ∈ Z
∗
N ,
and computes
r = gkph(m)σo mod No
s = g−yokp mod No.
The proxy signature of message m is the tuple (m, (r, s), Ip).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier checks whether (IDp, ω) = h(Ip)r
yosh(m) mod No.
If it does, the verifier accepts it as a valid proxy signature. Otherwise, rejects it.
Security: The scheme has a weak security as it is designed as a proxy-unprotected scheme,
where Alice can frame Bob by signing the message and later claim that Bob has signed the
message.
5.2.2 Lee, Kim and Kim [48]
A mobile agent is constructed in the scheme using non-designated proxy signature which
represents both the original signer’s (customer) and the proxy signer’s (remote server) sig-
natures.
Assumption: IFP is hard.
Alice chooses a public key yo and generates secret key xo ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yo).
The mobile agent (proxy signer) chooses a public key yp and generates secret key
xp ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice creates σo←Srsa(params-rsa, xo, (AliceID, req)),
where req is the customer requirements for purchase such as price range, date, delivery re-
quirements, etc.
Delegation capability verification: The mobile agent accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, yo, σo, (AliceID, req)).
Proxy signature generation: Let BID be the agent’s bid information which conforms to req.
The agent (remote server) tries to sell the product to Alice. The remote server computes
x = h(AliceID, req,AgentID,BID)xp mod Np, y = h(AliceID, req)
x mod No and z = σ
x
o
mod No. Then sends the tuple (AliceID, req,AgentID,BID, x, y, z) to the mobile agent
and the agent will get back to Alice with this tuple as a receipt of the purchase.
Proxy signature verification: Alice receives (AliceID, req,AgentID, BID, x, y, z) from the
mobile agent, then she can verify the validity of the purchase by the following:
- Whether h(AliceID, req,AgentID,BID) = xyp mod Np.
- Whether y = h(AliceID, req)x mod No.
- Whether y = zyo mod No.
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- Whether BID ∈ {req}.
Security: Wang et al. [82] showed that the scheme is insecure and inefficient.
5.2.3 Shao [68]
Proposed a proxy signature scheme based on the factoring problem, which combines the RSA
signature scheme and the Guillou and Quisquater [28] signature scheme.
Assumption: IFP hard and Guillou-Quisquater signature is secure.
Alice chooses a public key yo and generates secret key xo ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yo).
Bob chooses a public key yp and generates secret key xp ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes proxy key v = h(ω,ProxyID)−xo mod No,
u = ⌊v/Np⌋ and z = v
yp mod Np. The delegation is the tuple (ω, z, u).
Delegation capability verification: Bob recovers v = u×Np + (z
xp mod Np).
Proxy signature generation: Let m be the message to be signed by Bob. Bob does the
following:
- Randomly chooses an integer t ∈ [1, No] and computes r = t
yo mod No.
- Compute k = h(m, r) and x = kxp mod Np.
- Compute y = tvk mod No.
The proxy signature on message m is (m,ω, x, y, ProxyID).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier checks the following:
- Compute k′ = xyp mod Np.
- Compute r′ = yyoh(ω,ProxyID)k
′
mod No.
- Check whether k′ = h(m, r′).
Security: The security of the scheme is based on Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme [28].
However, the author did not give the formal security proof.
5.2.4 Das, Saxena and Gulati [19]
Proposed a proxy signature scheme that provides effective proxy revocation mechanism.
Assumption: IFP is hard.
In addition to Alice and Bob, a trusted server (TS) is another participant in the scheme for
time stamp issuance.
Alice chooses a public key yo and generates secret key xo ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yo).
Bob chooses a public key yp and generates secret key xp ←KGrsa(params-rsa, yp).
TS chooses a public key ys and generates secret key xs ←KGrsa(params-rsa, ys).
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes the delegation capability σo as
σo← Srsa(params-rsa, xo, (ω, yp, ys)).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, yo, σo, (ω, yp, ys)).
Proxy signature generation: Let m be the message to be signed. Bob requests a time stamp
to the TS and sends (R,m, yo, yp), where R← Srsa(params-rsa, xp, (m, ω, yo, yp)). The TS
verifies whether V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, yp, R, (m,ω, yo, yp)). If it holds, the TS ascertain
the following conditions are true before the time stamp is issued:
- Alice’s public key yo is not in the public revocation list maintained by the TS.
- ω is not expired.
Now, TS computes Tm ← Srsa(params-rsa, xs, (m,ω, yo, yp, T )), where T denotes a time
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stamp. Then, TS sends (Tm, T ) to Bob over a public channel.
Bob accepts T if and only if V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, ys, Tm, (m,ω, yo, yp, T )).
If it holds, Bob generates proxy signature as σp = (h(m,ω, yo, ys, T )⊕σo)
xp modNp, otherwise
rejects the time stamp and makes another request to the TS. The proxy signature of message
m is (m,ω, T, Tm, σp).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier checks the following to validate a proxy signature:
- Whether V alid←Vrsa(params-rsa, ys, Tm, (m,ω, yo, yp, T )). If it holds, the verifier is
assured that the time stamp in the signed message is correct. Otherwise, he rejects the
signed message.
- Whether h(ω, yp, ys) = (σ
yp
p mod Np ⊕ h(m,ω, yo, ys, T ))
yo mod No. If it holds, he
accepts the signed message. Otherwise, he rejects it.
Security: The scheme provides an effective proxy revocation mechanism. The scheme is secure
on the assumption that IFP is hard. However, the scheme does not work when Np > No,
but it is a valid assumption because typically the proxy signer key strength should not be
greater than the original signer key strength.
5.3 ECDSA-based Proxy Signature
5.3.1 Chen, Chung and Huang [13]
Proposed a scheme for proxy multi-signature based on elliptic curve cryptosystem that re-
duces high computational overheads of Sun’s scheme [74].
Assumption: ECDLP is hard.
Let B = (xB , yB) be a point in E(Fq) for a large prime q, the order of B is assumed as t.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the original signer secretly selects a random number 1 ≤ di ≤ t − 1 as
her private key and computes the corresponding public key Qi = di ×B = (xQi , yQi).
The proxy signer selects a private key 1 ≤ dp ≤ t− 1 and computes corresponding public key
Qp = dp× = (xQp , yQp).
Delegation capability generation: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the original signer Ai selects a random
number 1 ≤ ki ≤ t− 1, computes ri = ki ×B = (xri , yri) and si = xi · xQi · h(ω, ri)ki mod t.
Delegation capability verification and proxy key generation : For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the proxy
signer computes Ui = (xQi · h(ω, ri) mod t) × Qi − si × B = (xUi , yUi) using (ω, ri, si). If
xUi = xri mod t, the proxy signer accepts si as a valid delegation of signing right; otherwise,
he rejects it. If the proxy signer validates all (ω, ri, si) in which 1 ≤ i ≤ n, s/he then com-
putes d = dp · xQp +
∑n
i=1 si mod t as a valid proxy key.
Proxy signature generation: When the proxy signer signs a message m for A1, · · · , An, he
executes the signing operation of a designated signature scheme using the signing key d. The
resulting proxy signature is the tuple (m,σsp(m), r1, r2, · · · , rn, ω).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier computes the proxy public key Q corresponding
to the proxy key sp for verifying the proxy signature by the designated signature scheme:
Q = xQp ×Qp + (xQ1 · h(ω, r1) mod t×Q1 + · · ·+ (xQn · h(ω, rn) mod t×Qn(r1 + · · ·+ rn).
With the newly generated proxy public key Q, the verifier confirms the validity of σsp(m) by
validating the verification equation of the designated signature scheme.
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Security: The authors did not consider any security model for their scheme, instead, a heuris-
tic security analysis is given to safeguard the scheme.
5.4 Pairing-based Proxy Signature
Conventions and notation for pairings-based proxy signature schemes
Alice Original signer
Bob Proxy signer
G1 A cyclic additive group, whose order is prime q
G2 A cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q
P A generator of G1
eˆ A bilinear pairing map
H(·) Map-to-Point function
h(·) Collision-resistant one-way hash function
s PKG’s master-key
PubKGC KGC’s public key, PubKGC = sP
yo, xo Alice’s public key and secret key, respectively, yo = H(IDo)
yp, xp Bob’s public key and secret key, respectively, yp = H(IDp)
5.4.1 Zhang, Safavi-Naini and Lin [90]
Proposed an ID-based proxy signature based on Hess’s ID-based signature.
Assumption: WDHP is hard.
Alice computes her public key yo = H(IDo), where IDo is her identity. Then, Alice obtains
her secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo) from KGC.
Bob computes his public key yp = H(IDp), where IDp is his identity. Then, Bob obtains his
secret key xp ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yp) from KGC.
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes σo ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (ko, ro, co),
xo, ω).
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
V alid←Vcdhp(params-cdhp, yo, σo, (co, ω)).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp ← PKeyGencdhp(params-cdhp, σo, co,
xp).
Proxy signature generation: Bob picks a random number kp ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes
rp = eˆ(P,P )
kp , cp = h(m, rp) and σp ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (kp, cp), ρp, m).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature if and only if
V alid←Vcdhp(params-cdhp, (yo, yp), σp, (cp,m, ω)).
Security: The security proof is not rigorous. Only heuristic security analysis is given to
safeguard the scheme.
5.4.2 Chen, Zhang and Kim [15]
Proposed a multi-proxy signature scheme, where Alice delegates her signing capability to l
proxy signers.
Assumption: CDHP is hard.
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Alice computes her public key yo = H(IDo), where IDo is her identity. Then, Alice obtains
her secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo) from KGC.
Each proxy signer computes his public key ypi = H(IDpi), where IDpi is his identity. Then,
Each proxy signer obtains his secret key xpi ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, ypi) from KGC.
Delegation capability generation: Alice picks a random number ko ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes ro =
eˆ(P,P )ko , co = h(ω, ro) and σo ← Scdhp(params-cdhp, (ko, ro, co), xo, ω).
Delegation capability verification: Each proxy signer accepts σo if and only if
(kp, cp),←Vcdhp(params-cdhp, yo, σo, (co, ω)).
Proxy key generation: Each proxy signer computes proxy key as
ρpi ← PKeyGencdhp(params-cdhp, σo, co, xpi).
Proxy signature generation: Each proxy signer performs the following operations to sign a
message m:
- Pick randomly kpi ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes rpi = eˆ(P,P )
kpi and broadcasts rpi to the remain-
ing l − 1 proxy signers.
- Compute rp =
∏l
i=1 rpi and cp = h(m, rp), σpi = cpρpi + kpiP . Then, send σpi to a
designated clerk (one of the proxy signers).
- The clerk verifies the individual proxy signature and computes σp =
l∑
i=1
σpi. The proxy
signature of message m is the tuple (m,ω, ro, cp, σp).
Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature of message m if and
only if cp = h(m, eˆ(σp, P )(eˆ(
l∑
i=1
(yo + ypi, PubKGC)
h(ω,ro) · rlo)
−cp .
Security: The security proof is not rigorous.
5.4.3 Xu, Zhang and Feng [85]
Formalized a notion of security for ID-based proxy signature schemes and presented a proxy
signature scheme.
Assumption: CDHP is hard.
Alice computes her public key yo = H(IDo), where IDo is her identity. Then, Alice obtains
her secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo) from KGC.
Bob computes his public key yp = H(IDp), where IDp is his identity. Then, Bob obtains his
secret key xp ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yp). from KGC.
Delegation capability generation: Alice randomly picks ko ∈ Z
∗
q, computes ro = koP ,
Co = Ho(IDo, ω, ro) and σo = xo + koCo, where Ho : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×G1 → G1.
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
eˆ(σo, P ) = eˆ(PubKGC , yo)eˆ(ro, Co).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes proxy key ρp = h1(IDo, IDp, ω, ro)xp + σo, where
h1 : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×G1 → Z
∗
q.
Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m, Bob does the following:
- Picks kp ∈ Z
∗
q−1, computes rp = kpP and then puts Cp = Ho(IDp,m, rp).
- Computes σp = ρp + kpCp.
The proxy signature of message m is the tuple ((ro, rp), σp, (ω,m)).
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Proxy signature verification: The verifier accepts the proxy signature of message m iff
eˆ(σp, P ) = eˆ(PubKGC , yp)
h1((IDo,IDp,ω,ro))eˆ((PubKGC , yo)eˆ(rp, Cp)eˆ(ro, Co).
Security: Security of the scheme is based on the CDHP in the random oracle model. The
scheme takes large computation cost.
5.4.4 Zhang, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [91]
Proposed a proxy signature scheme based on a short signature scheme.
Assumption: CDHP is hard.
Alice computes her public key yo = H(IDo), where IDo is her identity. Then, Alice obtains
her secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo) from KGC.
Bob computes his public key yp = H(IDp), where IDp is his identity. Then, Bob obtains his
secret key xp ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yp) from KGC.
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes σo = (so + h(ω))
−1yp.
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
eˆ(h(ω)P + yo, σo) = eˆ(P, yp).
Proxy key generation: Bob computes ρp = xpσo.
Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m, Bob does the following.
- Chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗q−1 and computes U = r · (h(ω)P + yo).
- Computes t = H2(m,U) and σp = (t+ r)
−1ρp , where H2 : {0, 1}
∗ ×G1 → Z
∗
q.
The proxy signature of message m is (U, σp, ω).
Proxy signature verification : The verifier verifies whether
eˆ(U +H2(m,U)(h(ω)P + yo), σp) = eˆ(yp, yp).
Security: Security of the scheme is based on CDHP in the random oracle model.
5.4.5 Das, Saxena and Phatak [20]
Proposed a proxy signature scheme based on Hess signature scheme that provides effective
proxy revocation mechanism and avoids key escrow problem.
Assumption: CDHP is hard.
Alice computes her public key yo = H(IDo), where IDo is her identity. Then, Alice generates
her secret key xo ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yo).
Bob computes his public key yp = H(IDp), where IDp is his identity. Then, Bob generates
his secret key xp ←KGcdhp(params-cdhp, yp).
Delegation capability generation: Alice computes σo = (so + boH
′(ω, yo, yp), and ψo = boP .
Here, bo is secret to the original signer only and H
′ : {0, 1}∗ ×G1 ×G1 → G1.
Delegation capability verification: Bob accepts σo if and only if
eˆ(so, P ) = eˆ(ψo,H
′(ω, yo, yp)) · eˆ(yo, Rego), where Rego = sboP , registration
token published by the KGC.
Proxy key generation: Bob computes ρp = so + sp + bpH
′(ω, yo, yp). Here, bp is secret to the
proxy signer only.
Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m, Bob does the following.
- Selects a random r ∈ Z∗q and compute R = rP .
- Computes a = h(m,R, yp) and ψp = bpP , where h : {0, 1}
∗ ×G1 ×G1 → {0, 1}
∗.
- Computes σp = (r + a)
−1ρp.
The proxy signature of message m is (ω,m,R, σp, ψo, ψp, yo, yp).
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Proxy signature verification : The proxy signature is valid if and only if
eˆ(R + h(m,R, yp)P, σp) = eˆ(ψo + ψp,H
′(ω, yo, yp)) · eˆ(yo, Rego) · eˆ(yp, Regp).
Security: The scheme is proven secure and does not require secure channel in the key issuance.
6 Concluding Remarks
We reviewed a few seminal work on proxy signatures from the different security assumptions.
We now compare the reviewed schemes in a tabular manner, highlighting the important fea-
tures at a glance. In the following, Table-1 depicts the features of DLP-based schemes, Table-2
depicts the features of RSA-based schemes, and Table-3 depicts the features of Pairing-based
schemes.
Features →
Schemes ↓
Secure Secure
Channel
Proxy Re-
vocation
Remarks
Mambo et al[53] No Yes Partial Unlimited delegation
and misuse of delegation
Kim et al[40] Yes No No Secure
Zhang[87] No Yes No Insecure
Lee et al[48] No No No Insecure, suffers from
Transferring, Forgery
attacks
Boldyreva et
al[7]
Yes No No Based on [40] and for-
malizes the security no-
tion, but unlimited del-
egation
Li et al[49] Yes No No No formal security anal-
ysis
Herranz et al[33] Yes No No Distributed proxy sig-
nature, ideas based on
Boldyreva et al[7]
Malkin et al[52] Yes No No Secure, based on [40],
hierarchical delegation
Table 1: Computation time: DLP-based proxy signatures
Features →
Schemes ↓
Secure Secure
Channel
Proxy Re-
vocation
Remarks
Okamoto et
al[59]
Yes Yes No Does not provide strong
unforgeability and pre-
vention of misuse
Lee at al[48] No Yes No Insecure
Shao[68] No Yes No No formal security proof
Das et al[19] Yes No Yes Np < No
Table 2: Computation Time : RSA-based proxy signatures
It is observed that many times, a paper typically breaks a previous scheme and proposes
a new one, which someone breaks later and, in turn, proposes a new one, and so on. Most of
such work, though quite important and useful, essentially provides an incremental advance
to the same basic theme.
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Features →
Schemes ↓
Key
Escrow
Secure
Channel
Proxy Re-
vocation
Remarks
Zhang et al[90] Yes Yes No No formal security
proof, suffer from key
escrow, need secure
channel
Chen et al[15] Yes Yes No No formal security
proof, suffer from key
escrow, need secure
channel
Xu et al[85] Yes Yes No Takes high computation
cost, suffer from key es-
crow, need secure chan-
nel
Zhang et al[91] Yes Yes No suffer from key escrow,
need secure channel
Das et al[20] No No Yes Secure, no key escrow,
no secure channel
Table 3: Computation Time : Pairing-based proxy signatures
The authors tried to explore whether there are any real implementation of various proposed
proxy signatures. They contacted over email individual author(s) of some of the papers,
to learn whether their proposed scheme is used in real life scenario? Unfortunately, the
responses from several authors indicated that they were not aware of such applications which
use their scheme. Some even suggested that, since the authors work with real life banks
problems, whether it will possible to try their scheme in such applications.
In conclusion, we believe that the actual deployment of proxy signatures is yet to start in
a big way. However, as and when this happens, the research work being carried out will
certainly provide practically usable implementations.
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